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Abstract
This paper presents a smart surveillance system named
CASSANDRA, aimed at detecting instances of aggressive
human behavior in public environments. A distinguishing
aspect of CASSANDRA is the exploitation of the compli-
mentary nature of audio and video sensing to disambiguate
scene activity in real-life, noisy and dynamic environments.
At the lower level, independent analysis of the audio and
video streams yields intermediate descriptors of a scene
like: ”scream”, ”passing train” or ”articulation energy”. At
the higher level, a Dynamic Bayesian Network is used as
a fusion mechanism that produces an aggregate aggression
indication for the current scene. Our prototype system is
validated on a set of scenarios performed by professional
actors at an actual train station to ensure a realistic audio
and video noise setting.
1 Introduction
Surveillancetechnologyis increasingly ﬁelded to help safe-
guard public spaces such as train stations, shopping malls,
street corners, in view of mounting concerns about public
safety. Traditional surveillance systems require human op-
erators who monitor a wall of CCTV screens for speciﬁc
events that occur rarely. Advanced systems have the po-
tential to automatically ﬁlter-out spurious information and
present the operator only the security-relevant data. Ex-
isting systems have still limited capabilities; they typically
performvideo-basedintrusiondetection, andpossibly some
trajectory analysis, in fairly static environments.
In the context of human activity recognition in dynamic
environments, we focus on the relatively unexplored prob-
lem of aggression detection. Earlier work involved solely
the video domain and considered fairly controlled in-door
environments with static background and few (two) per-
sons [2]. Because events associated with the build-up or
enactment of aggression are difﬁcult to detect by a single
sensor modality (e.g. shouting versus hitting-someone),
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in this work we combine audio- and video-sensing. At
the low level raw sensor data are processed to compute
‘intermediate-level” events or features that summarize ac-
tivities in the scene. Examples of such descriptors imple-
mented in the current system are “scream” (audio) or “train
passing” and “articulation energy”(video). At the top level,
a Dynamic Bayesian Network combines the visual and au-
ditory events and incorporates any context-speciﬁc knowl-
edge in order to produce an aggregate aggression indica-
tion. This is unlikepreviousworkwhere audio-videofusion
dealt with speakerlocalizationforadvanceduser-interfaces,
i.e. using video information to direct a phased-array micro-
phone conﬁguration [8].
2 System Description
2.1 Audio Unit
Audio processing is performed in the time-frequency do-
main with an approach common in auditory scene analy-
sis [11]. The transformation of the time-signal to the time-
frequency domain is performed by a model1 of the human
ear [3]. This model is a transmission-line model with its
channels tuned accordingto the oscillatory propertiesof the
basilar membrane. Leaky-integration of the squared mem-
brane displacement results in an energy-spectrum, called a
cochleogram (see Fig. 1).
A signal component is deﬁned as a coherent area of the
cochleogramthatis verylikelyto stemfroma singlesource.
To obtain signal components, the cochleogram is ﬁrst ﬁl-
tered with a matched ﬁlter which encodes the response of
the cochlea to a perfect sinusoid of the frequencyapplicable
to that segment. Then the cochleogramis thresholded using
a cut-off value based on two times the standard deviation of
the energy values. Signal components are obtained as the
tracks formed by McAulay-Quatari tracking [7], applied on
this pre-processed version of the cochleogram. This entails
stringing the energy maxima of connected components to-
gether, over the successive frames.
1We thank Sound Intelligence (http://www.soundintel.com) for con-
tributing this model and cooperation on the aggression detection methods.
1Figure 1: Typical cochleograms of aggressive and normal
speech (top and bottom ﬁgure, respectively). Energy con-
tent is color-coded (increasing from blue to red). Note the
higher pitch (marked by white lines) and the more pro-
nounced higher harmonics for the aggressive speech case.
Codeveloping sinusoids with a frequency development
equal to an integer multiple of a fundamental frequency
(harmonics) are subsequently combined into harmonic
complexes. Note that these harmonics can be combined
safely because the probability is small that uncorrelated
sound sources show this measure of correlation by chance.
Little or no literature exists on the inﬂuence of aggres-
sion on the properties of speech. However the Component
Process Model from Scherer [9] and similarities with the
Lombard reﬂex [6] suggest a couple of important cues for
aggression. The component process theory assumes that
anger and panic, emotions strongly related to aggression,
are seen as a ergotropic arousal. This form of arousal is
accompanied by an increase in heart frequency,blood pres-
sure, transpiration and associated hormonal activity. The
predictions given by the model show many similarities with
the Lombard reﬂex.the vocal chords increases the pitch and
enhances the higher harmonics, which leads to an increase
in spectral tilt. These properties, pitch (fundamental fre-
quency (f0)) and spectral tilt (a measure of the slope of the
average energy distribution, calculated as the the energy of
the harmonics above 500 Hz divided by the energy of the
harmonics below 500 Hz) are calculated from the harmonic
complexes. The audio detector uses these two properties as
input for a decision tree. An example of normaland aggres-
sive speech can be seen in Fig. 1.
2.2 Video Unit
Analysis of the video stream aims primarily at computing
visualcuescharacteristicforphysicalaggressionamonghu-
mans. Physical aggression is usually characterized by fast
articulation of body parts (i.e. arms, legs). Therefore, a
principled approach for detecting aggression involves de-
tailed body-pose estimation, possibly in 3D, followed by
ballistic analysis of movements of body parts. Unfortu-
nately,at presentposeestimationremainsa signiﬁcantcom-
putationalchallenge. Various approaches[4] operateat lim-
ited rates and handlemostly a single personin a constrained
setting (limited occlusions, pre-ﬁtted body model).
Simpliﬁed approaches rely on a coarser representation
human body. An example is a system [2] that tracks a head
of a person by analyzing body contour and correlates ag-
gression with head’s “jerk” (derivative of acceleration). In
practice, high-orderderivatives related to body contours are
difﬁcult to estimate robustly in cases where the background
is not static and there is a possibility of occlusion.
2.2.1 Visual aggression features
Here we consider alternative cues based on an intuitive ob-
servation that aggressive behavior leads to highly energetic
body articulation. We estimate (pseudo-) kinetic energy of
body parts using a “bag-of-points” body model. The ap-
proach relies on simple image processing operations and
yields features highly correlated with aggression.
For detectingpeopleourvideosubsystem employsadap-
tive background/foreground subtraction technique [12].
Theassumptionofstatic backgroundscene holdsfairly well
in the center view area, where most of the people enter the
scene. After detection, people are represented as ellipses
and tracked with an extended version of the mean-shift
tracking algorithm [13]. The extended tracker adapts po-
sition and shape of the ellipse (tilt, axes) and thus facilitates
a close approximation of body area even for tilted/bended
poses. Additionally, the mean-shift tracker handles well
partial occlusions and achieves near real-time performance.
We consider human body as a collection of loosely con-
nected points with identical mass. While such a model is
clearly a simpliﬁcation, it reﬂects well the non-rigid nature
of a body and facilitates fast computations. Assuming Q
points attached to various body-parts, the average kinetic
energy of an articulating body is given by the average ki-
netic energy of points,
E =
1
Q
Q X
i=1
1
2
mi|vi − ve|2 (1)
where vi, mi denote, respectively, velocity vector and mass
of the ith point, and ve denotes the velocity vector of the
ellipserepresentingtheperson. Bydiscountingoverallbody
motion we capture only the articulation energy.
Due to the assumption of uniform mass distribution be-
tween points, the total body mass becomes a scale factor.
By omitting scale factors, we obtain a pseudo-kinetic en-
ergy estimate in the form ¯ E = 1
Q
PQ
i=1 |vi − ve|2. Such
2Figure 2: (Left) Optical-ﬂow features for detecting trains in
motion. (Right)Representingpeople: ellipses (fortracking)
and points (for articulation features).
featuresare assumed to measurearticulationand will be our
primary visual cues for aggression detection.
Computation of energyfeatures requires selecting image
points that represent a person. Ideally, the points would
coverthe limbs and the head since these parts are mostly ar-
ticulated. Further, to estimate velocities, the selected points
must be easy to track. Accordingly, we select Q = 100
pointswithinanextendedboundingboxofa personbyﬁnd-
ing pixels with the most local contrast [10]. Such points are
easy to track and usually align well with edges in an image
(which in turn often coincide with limbs as in Fig. 2, right).
For point tracking we use the KLT algorithm [10] (freely
available implementation from the OpenCV library).
2.2.2 Train detection
An additional objective of the video unit is detecting trains
in motion. Trains moving in and out of a station produce
auditory noise that often leads to spurious audio-aggression
detections. Therefore recognizing trains in video opens a
possibility for later suppressing of such detections.
A train usually appears as a large, rigid body and moves
along a constrained trajectory. For a given view and rail
section we deﬁne a mask that indicates the image regions
where a train typically appears. In this region we track
frame-to-frame motion of N = 100 image features with
KLT [10] tracker (Fig. 2, left). The features’ motion vec-
torsare classiﬁed as train/non-trainbya pre-trainednearest-
neighborclassiﬁer. A train in motionis detected when more
then50% of the features are classiﬁed positively. Due to the
constrainedmovementof trains, our detectorturns out quite
robust to occasional occlusions of the train area by people.
2.3 Fusion Unit
Thefusionunitproducesanaggregateaggressionindication
giventhe features/eventsproducedindependentlybythe au-
dioandvideosubsystems. Afundamentaldifﬁcultywithfu-
sion arises from inevitable ambiguities in human behavior
which make it difﬁcult to separate normal from aggressive
activities (evenfor a humanobserver). Additionalproblems
follow from various noise artifacts in the sensory data.
Given the noisy and ambiguous domain we resort to a
probabilistic formulation. The fusion unit employs a proba-
bilistic time-series model (a Dynamic Bayesian Network,
DBN [5]), where aggression level can be estimated in a
principled way by solving appropriate inference problem.
2.3.1 Basic model
We denote the discrete-time index as k = 1,2,..., and set
the gap between discrete-time steps (clock ticks) to 50ms.
At the kth step, ya
k ∈ {0,1} denotes the output of audio
aggressiondetector, and yv
j,k denotes the pseudo-kineticen-
ergy of the jth, j = 1,...,J, person. Our system can com-
priseseveraltraindetectorsmonitoringnon-overlappingrail
sections. Thebinaryoutputofthe mth,m = 1,...,4 = M,
train detector will be denoted as yT
m,k ∈ {0,1}. (We tested
a conﬁguration with M = 4.)
Our aim is to detect ”ambient”scene aggression,without
deciding precisely which persons are aggressive. Therefore
we reason on the basis of a cumulative articulation mea-
surement yv
k =
P
j yv
j,k over all persons. Additionally, the
cumulative is quite robust to (near-)occlusions when articu-
lation of one person could be wrongly attributed to another.
In orderto reason aboutaggressionlevel, we use a 5-step
discrete scale  0,1 : 0.0 (no activity), 0.2 (normal activity),
0.4 (attention required), 0.6 (minor disturbance), 0.8 (major
disturbance), and 1.0 (critical aggression).
Importantly, the aggression level obeys speciﬁc corre-
lations over time and should be represented as a process
(rather than an instantaneous quantity). We will denote ag-
gression level at step k as ak and deﬁne a stochastic process
{ak} with dynamics given by a 1st order model:
p(ak+1 = i|ak = j) = CPTa(i,j), (2)
where CPTa(i,j), denotes a conditional probability table.
In a sense, the ﬁrst order model is a simpliﬁcation as it cap-
tures only short-term dependencies.
The measured visual (yv
k) and auditory (ya
k) features are
treated as samples from an observation distribution (model)
that depends on the aggression level ak. Since (later on) we
will incorporate information about passing trains, we intro-
duce a latent train-noise indicator variable nk ∈ {0,1} and
assume that the observation model
p(y
v
k,y
a
k|ak,nk)
depends also on the train-noise indicator. The model takes
the form of a conditional probability table CPTo, where the
cumulative articulation feature is discretized.
2.3.2 Train models
The fusion DBN comprises several subnetworks — train
models which couple train detections yT
m,k with the latent
3train-noise indicator nk. Additionally, each train model en-
codes prior information about duration of a train pass.
For the mth rail section, we introduce a latent indicator
im,k ∈ {0,1} of a train passing at step k. We assume that
the train detections yT
m,k, the train-pass indicators im,k, and
the train noise nk obey a probabilistic relation
p(yT
m,k|im,k) = CPTt(yT
m,k,im,k) (3)
p(nk|i1:M,k) = CPTn(nk,i1:M,k). (4)
Foreachrail, themodel(3)encodesinaccuraciesofdetector
(mis-detections,false alarms). The model (4) represents the
fact that passing trains usually induce noise, but also that
sometimes noise is present without a passing train.
Since a typical pass takes 5 − 10 seconds (100 − 200
steps) the pass indicator variable exhibits strong temporal
correlations. We represent such correlations with a time-
series model based on a gamma distribution. A gamma pdf
γ(τm,αm,βm) is a convenient choice for modeling dura-
tion τm of an event (αm, βm are parameters). To apply this
model in a time-series formulation, we replace the total du-
ration τm with a partial duration τm,k that indicates how
long a train is already passing a scene at step k.
By considering a joint process {im,k,τm,k} temporal
correlations can be enforced by the following model
p(im,k+1 = 1|τm,k,im,k = 0) = ηm
p(im,k+1 = 1|τm,k,im,k = 1) = p(τm > τm,k) =
=
Z +∞
τm,k
γ(τm,αm,βm)dτm = 1 − F(τm,k,αm,βm),
where F() is a gamma cumulative density function. Param-
eter ηm denotes a probability of starting a new train pass.
At the kth step, the probability of continuing a pass is func-
tion of the current duration of the pass. A conﬁguration
(im,k+1 = 1, τm,k, im,k = 1) implies that a pass does not
ﬁnishyetandthetotalpassdurationwill belargerthanτm,k,
hence the integration. Further, the partial duration variable
obeys a deterministic regime
τm,k+1 =
￿
0 iff im,k+1 = 0
τm,k+1 = τm,k + ǫ otherwise ,
where ǫ = 50ms is the period between successive steps.
2.3.3 Inference and Learning
In a probabilistic framework, reasoning about aggression
corresponds to solving probabilistic inference problems. In
an online mode, the key quantity of interest is the posterior
distribution on aggression level given data collected at up
to the current step, p(ak|yv
1:k,ya
1:k,yt
1:m,1:k). From this dis-
tribution we calculate the expected aggression value, which
will be the basic output of the fusion system.
yT
m,k yT
m,k+1
    τm,k τm,k+1    
    im,k im,k+1    
M
nk nk+1
    ak ak+1    
yk yk+1
Figure 3: Dynamic Bayesian Network representing the
probabilistic fusion model. The rectangular plate indicates
M = 4 replications of the train sub-network.
Given the graphical structure of the model (Fig. 3),
the required distribution can be efﬁciently computed us-
ing a recursive, forward ﬁltering procedure [5]. We im-
plemented an approximate variant of the ﬁltering proce-
dure, known as the Boyen-Koller algorithm [1]. At a given
step k, the algorithm maintains only marginal distributions
p(hk|yv
1:k,ya
1:k,yt
1:m,1:k), where hk is any of the latent vari-
ables. When new detector data arrive, the current-step
marginals are updated to represent the next-step marginals.
An important modeling aspect are temporal develop-
ments of processes in the scene. Unlike the binary train-
pass events, aggression level usually undergoes more sub-
tle evolutions as the tension and anger among people build
up. Since the assumed (1st-order) model might not capture
well long-termeffects and a stronger modelwould be rather
complicatedwe enforcetemporalcorrelationswith a simple
low-pass ﬁlter. The articulation measurements (before in-
ference) and the expected aggression level (after inference)
are low-pass ﬁltered using a 10s running-averageﬁlter.
The parameters of our model: probability tables: CPTa,
CPTo, CPTn, CPTt and the parameters αm,βm of the
gamma pdf’s) are estimated by maximum-likelihood learn-
ing. The learning process relies on detector measurements
from training audio-video clips and ground-truth annota-
tions. The annotations are particularly important for learn-
ing the observation model CPTo. An increased probability
of a false auditory aggression in the presence of train noise,
will suppress the contribution of audio data to the aggres-
sion level when the video subsystem reports a passing train.
3 Experiments
We evaluate the aggression detection system using a set of
13 audio-video clips (scenarios) recorded at a train station.
4Figure 4: A screen-shot of the CASSANDRA prototype
system. In the lower part of the right window, various in-
termediate quantities are shown: the probabilities for trains
on various tracks (currently zero), the output of the video-
based articulation energy (”People”, currently mid-way),
the output of the audio detector (currently at maximum).
The slider covering the right side shows the overall esti-
mated aggression level (currently ”major disturbance”).
The clips (each 100s − 150s) feature 2-4 professional ac-
tors who engage in a variety of activities ranging from nor-
mal (walking) through slightly excited (shouting, running,
hugging), moderate aggressive (pushing, hitting a vending
machine)to critically aggressive (football-supportersclash-
ing). The recording took place at a platform of an actual
train station (between two rail tracks, partially outdoor)and
therefore incorporates realistic artifacts, like noise and vi-
brations from trains, variable illumination, wind, etc.
Scenarios have been manually annotated with a ground-
truth aggression level by two independent observers using
the scale mentioned in Sect. 2.3.1. Aggression toward ob-
jects was rated approx. 25% lower than aggression toward
humans, i.e. the former did not exceed a level of 0.8.
Fig. 5 details the results of the CASSANDRA system
on a scenario involving gradual aggression build-up. Here,
two pairs of competing supporters ﬁrst start arguing, then
get in a ﬁght. The bottom panel shows some illustrative
frames, with articulation features highlighted. We see from
Fig. 5 that the raw (before low-pass ﬁltering) articulation
measurements are rather noisy, however the low-pass ﬁlter-
ing reveals strong correlation with ground-truth aggression
level. The effect of low-pass ﬁltering of the estimated ag-
gression level is shown bottom plot of Fig. 5. A screen-shot
of the CASSANDRA system in action is shown in Fig. 4.
We considered two quantitative criteria to evaluate our
system. The ﬁrst is the deviation of the CASSANDRA es-
timated aggression level from the ground-truth annotation.
Here we obtained a deviation of mean 0.17 with standard
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Figure 5: Aggression build-up scenario. (Top graph)
Audio-aggression detections. (Middle graph) Visual ar-
ticulation measurements. (Bottom graph) Estimated and
ground-truth aggression level. The gray lines show un-
certainty intervals (2× std. deviation) around raw (before
ﬁltering) expected level. (Images) Several frames (times-
tamps: 45s, 77s, 91s, 95s). Notice correspondence with
the articulation measurements.
Figure6: Selected framesfroma scenarioinvolvingaggres-
sion toward a machine.
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Figure 7: Cumulative detection results by sensor modality.
deviation 0.1. The second performance criterion considers
aggressiondetectionasatwo-classclassiﬁcationproblemof
distinguishing between ”normal” and ”aggressive” events
(by thresholdingaggression level at 0.5). Matchingground-
truth with estimated events allows us to compute detection
rate (%) and false-alarm rate (per hour). When matching
events we allowed a time deviation of 10s. The cumula-
tive results of leave-one-out tests on 13 scenarios (12 for
training, 1 for testing) are given in Fig. 7. Comparing the
test results for three modalities (audio, video, fusion of au-
dio+video), we notice that the auditory and visual features
indeedare complimentary;with fusion the overall detection
rate increased without introducing additional false alarms.
It is important to note that our data set is heavily biased
toward occurrences of aggression, i.e. which put the sys-
tem to a difﬁcult test. We expect CASSANDRA to pro-
ducemuchless false alarmsin a typical surveillancesetting,
where most of the time nothing happens.
Table 1 gives an overview of the detection results on the
scenarios. We notice that the system performed well on
the clearly normal cases (scenarios 1-3) or aggressive cases
(scenarios 9-13), while borderline scenarios were more dif-
ﬁcult to classify. The borderline behavior (e.g. scenarios
7-8) turns out also difﬁcult to classify for human observers
given the inconsistent ground-truthannotation in Tab. 1.
The CASSANDRA system runs on two PCs (one with
the video and fusion units, the other with the audio unit).
Theoverallprocessingrateis approx. 5Hzwith756×560×
20Hz input video stream and 44kHz input audio stream.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We demonstrated a prototype system that uses a Dynamical
Bayesian Network to fuse auditory and visual information
for detecting aggressive behavior. On the auditory side, the
system relies on scream-like cues, and on the video side,
the system uses motion features related to articulation. We
obtaineda promisingaggression detectionperformancein a
complex, real-world train station setting, operating in near-
ground-truth detected events
id scenario content positive true-pos. false-pos.
1 normal: walking, greeting 0 0 0
2 normal: walking, greeting 0 0 1
3 excited: lively argument 0 0 0
4 excited: lively argument 1 1 0
5 aggression toward a vend. machine 1 0 1
6 aggression toward a vend. machine 1 0 0
7 happy football supporters 1 1 0
8 happy football supporters 0 0 1
9 supporters harassing a passenger 1 1 0
10 supporters harassing a passenger 1 1 0
11 two people ﬁght, third intervenes 1 1 0
12 four people ﬁghting 1 1 0
13 four people ﬁghting 1 1 1
Table1: Aggressiondetectionresults byscenario. Thetable
indicates number of events (positive=aggressive). Figure 6
shows example frames from the 5th scenario.
realtime.
The present system is able to distinguish well between
clearcases ofaggressionandnormalbehavior. Inthefuture,
we plan to focus increasinglyon the ”borderline”cases. For
this, we expect to use more elaborate auditory cues (laugh-
ter vs scream), more detailed visual cues (indications of
body-contact, partial body-pose estimation), and stronger
use of context information.
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